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Abstract. Bogdanov and Lee suggested a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme based on error
correcting codes. The underlying public code is a modified Reed-Solomon code obtained from inserting
a zero submatrix in the Vandermonde generating matrix defining it. The columns that define this
submatrix are kept secret and form a set L. We give here a distinguisher that detects if one or several
columns belong to L or not. This distinguisher is obtained by considering the code generated by
component-wise products of codewords of the public code (the so called “square code”). This operation
is applied to punctured versions of this square code obtained by picking a subset I of the whole set
of columns. It turns out that the dimension of the punctured square code is directly related to the
cardinality of the intersection of I with L. This allows an attack which recovers the full set L and which
can then decrypt any ciphertext.
1 Introduction
The concept of homomorphic encryption was first proposed in 1978 in [RAD78]. But it took more
than three decades to see the first scheme of this kind [Gen09]. It is based on ideal lattices. Since
then several proposals have been made, most of them rely on lattice theory. One challenging issue is
to come up with a homomorphic encryption scheme using different security assumptions. Recently,
the first symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme based on error-correcting codes was proposed
in [AAPS11]. This work was then followed by [BL12] which can be considered as the first public-
key homomorphic scheme based on coding theory. This particular cryptosystem heavily relies on
properties of Reed-Solomon codes. These codes have been suggested for the first time in a public-
key cryptosystem in [Nie86] but it was shown to be insecure in [SS92]. The attack recovers the
underlying Reed-Solomon allowing the decoding of any encrypted data obtained from a McEliece-
type cryptosystem based on them. The McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] on the other hand uses
Goppa codes. Since its apparition, it has withstood many attacks and after more than thirty years
now, it still belongs to the very few unbroken public key cryptosystems. This situation substantiates
the claim that inverting the encryption function, and in particular recovering the private key from
public data, is intractable.
No significant breakthrough has been observed with respect to the problem of recovering the
private key [Gib91,LS01]. This has led to claim that the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code
does not disclose any visible structure that an attacker could exploit. This is strengthened by the fact
that Goppa codes share many characteristics with random codes: for instance they asymptotically
meet the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, they typically have a trivial permutation group, etc. Hence,
the hardness of the Goppa code distinguishing problem, which asks whether a Goppa code can be
distinguished from a random code, has become a classical belief in code-based cryptography, and
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as a consequence, a mandatory assumption to prove semantic security in the random oracle model
[NIKM08], CCA2 security in the standard model [DMQN09] and security in the random oracle
model against existential forgery [CFS01,Dal07] of the signature scheme [CFS01].
In [FGO+11], an algorithm that manages to distinguish between a random code and a Goppa
code has been introduced. This work without undermining the security of [McE78] prompts to
wonder whether it would be possible to devise an attack based on such a distinguisher. It was
found out in [MCP12] that our distinguisher [FGO+11] has an equivalent but simpler description
in terms of the component-wise product of codes. This notion was first put forward in coding
theory to unify many different algebraic decoding algorithms [Pel92,Ko¨t92]. This distinguisher is
even more powerful in the case of Reed-Solomon codes than for Goppa codes because, whereas for
Goppa codes it is only successful for rates close to 1, it can distinguish Reed-Solomon codes of any
rate from random codes. In the specific case of [BL12], the underlying public code is a modified
Reed-Solomon code obtained from inserting a zero submatrix in the Vandermonde generating matrix
defining it and in this case our distinguisher leads to an attack. We present namely in this paper
a key-recovery attack on the Bogdanov-Lee homomorphic scheme based on the version of our
distinguisher presented in [MCP12]. Our attack runs in polynomial time and is efficient: it only
amounts to calculate the ranks of certain matrices derived from the public key.
More precisely, in their cryptosystem the columns that define the zero submatrix are kept secret
and form a set L. We give here a distinguisher that detects if one or several columns belong to
L or not. This distinguisher is obtained by considering the code generated by component-wise
products of codewords of the public code (the so called “square code”). This operation is applied to
punctured versions of this square code obtained by picking a subset I of the whole set of columns.
It turns out that the dimension of the punctured square code is directly related to the cardinality
of the intersection of I with L. This allows an attack which recovers the full set L and which can
then decrypt any ciphertext.
It should also been pointed out that the properties of Reed-Solomon codes with respect to the
component-wise product of codes have already been used to cryptanalyze a McEliece scheme based
on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10]. The use of this product is nevertheless different in
[Wie10] from the way we use it here. Note also that our attack is not an adaptation of the Sidelnikov
and Shestakov approach [SS92]. Our approach is completely new: it illustrates how a distinguisher
that detects an abnormal behaviour can be used to recover the private key.
In Section 2 we recall important notions from coding theory. In Section 3 we introduce the
cryptosystem and in Section 4 we present the key recovery attack.
2 Reed-Solomon codes and the square code
We recall in this section a few relevant results and definitions from coding theory and bring in the
fundamental notion which is used in the attack, namely the square code. A linear code C of length
n and dimension k over a finite field GF (q) of q elements is a subspace of dimension k of the full
space GF (q)n. It is generally specified by a full-rank matrix called a generator matrix which is a
k × n matrix G (with k ≤ n) over GF (q) whose rows span the code:
C =
{
uG | u ∈ GF (q)k
}
.
It can also be specified by a parity-check matrix H , which is a matrix whose right kernel is equal
to the code, that is
C =
{
x ∈ GF (q)n |HxT = 0
}
,
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where xT stands for the column vector which is the transpose of the row vector x. The rate of
the code is given by the ratio kn . Code-based public-key cryptography focuses on linear codes that
have a polynomial time decoding algorithm. The role of decoding algorithms is to correct errors
of prescribed weight. We say that a decoding algorithm corrects t errors if it recovers u from the
knowledge of uG+ e for all possible e ∈ Fnq of weight at most t.
Reed-Solomon codes form a special case of codes with a very powerful low complexity decoding
algorithm. It will be convenient to use the definition of Reed-Solomon codes and generalized Reed-
Solomon codes as evaluation codes
Definition 1 (Reed-Solomon code and generalized Reed-Solomon code). Let k and n be
integers such that 1 6 k < n 6 q where q is a power of a prime number. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an
n-tuple of distinct elements of GF (q). The Reed-Solomon code RSk(x) of dimension k is the set of
(p(x1), . . . , p(xn)) when p ranges over all polynomials of degree 6 k− 1 with coefficients in GF (q).
The generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk(x,y) of dimension k is associated to a couple (x,y) ∈
GF (q)n × GF (q)n where x is chosen as above and the entries yi are arbitrary non zero elements
in GF (q). It is defined as the set of (y1p(x1), . . . , ynp(xn)) where p ranges over all polynomials of
degree 6 k − 1 with coefficients in GF (q).
Generalized Reed-Solomon codes are quite important in coding theory due to the conjunction
of several factors such as :
(i) their minimum distance d is maximal among all codes of the same dimension and length since
they are MDS codes (their distance is equal to n− k + 1),
(ii) they can be efficiently decoded in polynomial time when the number of errors is less than or
equal to ⌊d−1
2
⌋ = ⌊n−k
2
⌋.
It has been suggested to use them in a public-key cryptosystem for the first time in [Nie86] but
it was discovered that this scheme is insecure in [SS92]. Sidelnikov and Shestakov namely showed
that it is possible to recover in polynomial time for any generalized Reed-Solomon code a possible
couple (x,y) which defines it. This is all what is needed to decode efficiently such codes and is
therefore enough to break the Niederreiter cryptosystem suggested in [Nie86] or a McEliece type
cryptosystem [McE78] when Reed-Solomon are used instead of Goppa codes.
We could not find a way to adapt the Sidelnikov and Shestakov approach for cryptanalyzing the
Bogadnov and Lee cryptosystem. However a Reed-Solomon displays a quite peculiar property with
respect to the component-wise product which is denoted by a ⋆ b for two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an)
and b = (b1, . . . , bn) and which is defined by a ⋆ b
def
= (a1b1, . . . , anbn). This can be seen by bringing
in the following definition
Definition 2 (star product of two codes, square code). Let A and B be two codes of length
n. The star product code denoted by < A ⋆ B > of A and B is the vector space spanned by all
products a⋆b where a and b range over A and B respectively. When B = A , < A ⋆A > is called
the square code of A and is denoted by < A 2 >.
It is clear that < A ⋆B > is also generated by the ai ⋆ bj’s where the ai’s and the bj ’s form a
basis of A and B respectively. Therefore
Proposition 1.
dim(< A ⋆B >) ≤ dim(A )dim(B).
We expect that the square code when applied to a random linear code should be a code of dimension
of order min
{(k+1
2
)
, n
}
. Actually by using the proof technique of [FGO+11] it can be shown for
instance that with probability going to 1 as k tends to infinity, the square code is of dimension
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min
{(k+1
2
)
(1 + o(1)), n
}
when k is of the form k = o(n1/2). On the other hand generalized Reed
Solomon codes behave in a completely different way
Proposition 2. < GRSk(x,y)
2 >= GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y).
This follows immediately from the definition of a generalized Reed Solomon code as an evaluation
code since the star product of two elements c = (y1p(x1), . . . , ynp(xn)) and c
′ = (y1q(x1), . . . , ynq(xn))
of GRSk(x,y) where p and q are two polynomials of degree at most k − 1 is of the form
c ⋆ c′ = (y21p(x1)q(x2), . . . , y
2
np(xn)q(xn)) = (y
2
1r(x1), . . . , y
2
nr(xn))
where r is a polynomial of degree≤ 2k−2. Conversely, any element of the form (y21r(x1), . . . , y
2
nr(xn))
where r is a polynomial of degree less than or equal to 2k−1 is a linear combination of star products
of two elements of GRSk(x,y).
This proposition shows that the square code is only of dimension 2k−1 when 2k−1 ≤ n, which
is quite unusual. This property can also be used in the case 2k − 1 > n. To see this, consider the
dual of the Reed-Solomon code. The dual C⊥ of a code C of length n over GF (q) is defined by
C
⊥ = {x ∈ GF (q)n|(x,y) = 0,y ∈ C } ,
where (x,y) =
∑
xiyi stands for the standard inner product between elements of GF (q)
n. The dual
of a generalized Reed-Solomon code is itself a generalized Reed-Solomon code, see [MS86, Theorem
4, p.304]
Proposition 3.
GRSk(x,y)
⊥ = GRSn−k(x,y
′)
where the length of GRSk(x,y) is n and y
′ is a certain element of GF (q)n depending on x and y.
Therefore when 2k− 1 > n a Reed-Solomon code GRSk(x,y) can also be distinguished from a
random linear code of the same dimension by computing the dimension of <
(
GRSk(x,y)
⊥
)2
>.
We have in this case
<
(
GRSk(x,y)
⊥
)2
>=< GRSn−k(x,y
′)2 >=<GRS2n−2k−1(x,y
′ ⋆ y′) >
and we obtain a code of dimension 2n− 2k − 1.
The star product of two codes is the fundamental notion used in the decoding algorithm based
on an error correcting pair [Pel92,Ko¨t92] which unifies common ideas to many algebraic decoding
algorithms. It has been used for the first time to cryptanalyze a McEliece scheme based on subcodes
of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10]. The use of the star product is nevertheless different in [Wie10] from
the way we use it here. In this paper, the star product is used to identify for a certain subcode C of
a generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk(x,y) a possible pair (x,y). This is achieved by computing
< C 2 > which in the case which is considered turns out to be equal to < GRSk(x,y)
2 > which
is equal to GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y). The Sidelnikov and Shestakov is then used on < C
2 > to recover
a possible (x,y ⋆ y) pair to describe < C 2 > as a generalized Reed-Solomon code. From this, a
possible (x,y) pair for which C ⊂ GRSk(x,y) is deduced.
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3 The Bogdanov-Lee Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem proposed by Bogdanov and Lee in [BL12] is a public-key homomorphic encryption
scheme based on linear codes. It encrypts a plaintext m from GF (q) into a ciphertext c that belongs
to GF (q)n where n is a given integer. The key generation requires a non-negative integer ℓ such
that 3ℓ < n and a subset L of {1, . . . , n} of cardinality 3ℓ. A set of n distinct elements x1, . . . , xn
from GF (q) are generated at random. They serve to construct a k×n matrix G whose i-th column
GTi (1 6 i 6 n) is defined by:
GTi
def
=


(xi, x
2
i , . . . , x
ℓ
i , 0, . . . , 0) if i ∈ L
(xi, x
2
i , . . . , x
ℓ
i , x
ℓ+1
i , . . . , x
k
i ) if i /∈ L
where the symbol T stands for the transpose.
In other words, when L is the set {1, . . . , 3ℓ}, G is the following matrix:


x1 . . . x3ℓ x3ℓ+1 . . . xn
...
...
...
...
xℓ1 . . . x
ℓ
3ℓ x
ℓ
3ℓ+1 . . . x
ℓ
n
0 . . . 0 xℓ+1
3ℓ+1 . . . x
ℓ+1
n
...
...
...
...
0 . . . 0 xk
3ℓ+1 . . . x
k
n


.
The cryptosystem is now defined as follows.
– Secret key: (L,G).
– Public key: P
def
= SG where S is a k × k random invertible matrix over GF (q).
– Encryption: the ciphertext c ∈ GF (q)n of a plaintext m ∈ GF (q) is obtained by picking x
in GF (q)k uniformly at random and e in GF (q)n by choosing its components according to a
certain distribution η˜, then computing c
def
= xP +m1+ e where 1 ∈ GF (q)n is the all-ones row
vector.
– Decryption: the linear system (1) is solved for y
def
= (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ GF (q)
n:


GyT = 0∑
i∈L
yi = 1
yi = 0 for all i /∈ L.
(1)
The plaintext is m =
n∑
i=1
yici.
The decryption algorithm will output the correct plaintext when ℓ and n are chosen such that
the entry ei at position i of the error vector is zero when i ∈ L. The distribution η which is used
to draw at random the coordinates of e is chosen such that this property holds with very large
probability. To check the correctness of the algorithm when this property on e holds, notice that
the linear system (1) has 3ℓ unknowns and ℓ+ 1 equations and since it is by construction of rank
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ℓ+ 1, it always admits at least one solution. Then observe that
n∑
i=1
yici = (xP +m1+ e)y
T
= (xP +m1)yT (since ei = 0 if i ∈ L and yi = 0 if i /∈ L)
= xSGyT +m
n∑
i=1
yi
=m (since GyT = 0 and
n∑
i=1
yi = 1).
The parameters k, q, ℓ and the noise distribution η˜ are chosen such as
– q = Ω
(
2n
α)
;
– k = Θ
(
n1−α/8
)
;
– the noise distribution η˜ is the q-ary symmetric channel with noise rate η = Θ
(
1/n1−α/4
)
, that
is Prob(ei = 0) = 1− η and Prob(ei = x) =
η
q−1 for any x in GF (q) different from zero;
– ℓ = Θ
(
nα/4
)
;
where α is some constant in the range (0, 1
4
]. It is readily checked that the probability that ei 6= 0
for i ∈ L is vanishing as n goes to infinity since it is upper-bounded by ηℓ = Θ
(
nα/4
n1−α/4
)
=
Θ
(
n−1+α/2
)
= o(1).
4 An efficient attack on the Bogdanov-Lee homomophic cryptosystem
4.1 Outline
The attack consists in first recovering the secret set L and from here finds directly a suitable vector
y by solving the system 

PyT = 0∑
i∈L
yi = 1
yi = 0 for all i /∈ L.
(2)
Indeed, requiring that PyT = 0 is equivalent to SGyT = 0 and since S is invertible this is
equivalent to the equation GyT = 0. Therefore System (2) is equivalent to the “secret” system (1).
An attacker may therefore recover m without even knowing G just by outputting
∑
i yici for any
solution y of (2). In the following subsection, we will explain how L can be recovered from P in
polynomial time.
4.2 Recovering L
Our attack relies heavily on the fact that the public matrix may be viewed as a the generator matrix
of a code C which is quite close to a generalized Reed-Solomon code (or to a Reed-Solomon if a
row consisting only of 1’s is added to it). Notice that any punctured version of the code has also
this property (a punctured code consists in keeping only a fixed subset of positions in a codeword).
More precisely, let us introduce
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Definition 3. For any I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality |I|, the restriction of a code A of length n is
the subset of GF (q)|I| defined as:
AI
def
=
{
v ∈ GF (q)|I| | ∃a ∈ A ,v = (ai)i∈I
}
.
The results about the unusual dimension of the square of a Reed-Solomon codes which are given
in Section 2 prompt us to study the dimension of the square code < C 2 > or more generally the
dimension of < C 2I >. When I contains no positions in L, then CI is nothing but a generalized
Reed-Solomon code and we expect a dimension of 2k−1 when |I| is larger than 2k−1. On the other
hand, when there are positions in I which also belong to L we expect the dimension to become
bigger and the dimension of < C 2 > to behave as an increasing function of |I ∩L|. This is exactly
what happens as shown in the proposition below.
Proposition 4. Let I be a subset of {1, . . . , n} and set J
def
= I ∩ L. If the cardinality of I and J
satisfy |J | 6 ℓ− 1 and |I| − |J | > 2k then
dim(< C 2I >) = 2k − 1 + |J | . (3)
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A. An attacker can exploit this propo-
sition to mount a distinguisher that recognizes whether a given position belongs to the secret set L.
At first a set I which satisfies with high probability the assumptions of Proposition 4 is randomly
chosen. Take for instance |I| = 3k. Then dI
def
= dim(< C 2I >) is computed. Next, one element x is
removed from I to get a new set I ′ and dI′ = dim(< C
2
I′ >) is computed. The only two possible
cases are then:
1. if x /∈ L then dI′ = dI
2. and if x ∈ L then dI′ = dI − 1.
By repeating this procedure, the whole set J = I ∩ L is easily recovered. The next step now is to
find all the elements of L that are not in I. One solution is to exchange one element in I \ J by
another element in {1, . . . , n}\I and compare the values of dI . If it increases, it means that the new
element belongs to L. At the end of this procedure the set L is totally recovered. This probabilistic
algorithm is obviously of polynomial time complexity and breaks completely the homomorphic
scheme suggested in [BL12].
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A Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 proceeds by exhibiting a basis of the linear space < C 2I >. For this
purpose we define for any t in {1, . . . , k}, Xt
def
= (xti)i∈I and Y
t def= (Y ti )i∈I with:
Y ti
def
=


0 if i ∈ J
xti if i ∈ I \ J.
Notice that CI is the vector space spanned by the X
t’s for 1 6 t 6 ℓ and the Y t’s for ℓ+1 6 t 6 k.
The proof of Proposition 4 starts by giving a generating set for < C 2I >.
Lemma 1. < C 2I > is generated by the set of vectors X
t for 2 6 t 6 2ℓ and Y t for ℓ+2 6 t 6 2k.
Proof. Let us define:
Zt
def
=


Xt if 1 6 t 6 ℓ
Y t if ℓ+ 1 6 t 6 k.
Obviously, < C 2I > is generated by the vectors Z
r ⋆ Zs where r and s range over {1, . . . , k}. We
notice now that
Zr ⋆Zs
def
=


Xr+s if r and s ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}
Y r+s if r or s /∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
In particular, the following equality holds:
{
Zr ⋆Zs | 1 6 r 6 k and 1 6 s 6 k
}
=
{
Xt | 2 6 t 6 2ℓ
}⋃{
Y t | ℓ+ 2 6 t 6 2k
}
.
⊓⊔
The next step is to find some linear relations between the Xt’s and the Y t’s. This is achieved
by
Lemma 2. If ℓ+ |J |+ 2 6 t 6 2ℓ, then Xt belongs to the vector space generated by
t−1⋃
u=ℓ+2
{
Xu,Y u
}⋃{
Y t
}
.
Proof. We consider U as an indeterminate and we define the polynomials ϕ(U) and R(U) as ϕ(U)
def
=∏
i∈J
(U −xi) and R(U)
def
= ϕ(U)U t−|J |. The degree of R(U) is equal to t and hence satisfies deg(R) 6
2ℓ. R(U) can also be viewed as the polynomial
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsU
s where each rs belongs to GF (q) and
rt = 1. One can see that by construction of R(U) when i ∈ J then R(xi) =
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsx
s
i = 0. So if
we denote by Xsi (resp. Y
s
i ) the entry of X
s (resp. Y s) at position i we equivalently have when
i ∈ J :
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsX
s
i =
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsx
s
i = R(xi) = 0.
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By the very definition of Y si which is equal to 0 when i ∈ J , we have that
∑t
s=t−|J | rsY
s
i = 0. On
the other hand by definition of Xs and Y s, we also have that
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsX
s
i =
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsY
s
i
for i in I \ J . Therefore in all cases we have
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsX
s
i =
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsY
s
i ,
and since rt = 1 we can write that:
X t =
t∑
s=t−|J |
rsY
s −
t−1∑
s=t−|J |
rsX
s.
This concludes the proof of the lemma by noticing that t ≥ |J | + ℓ + 2 implies that the s which
appears in the sum above is larger than or equal to ℓ+ 2. ⊓⊔
It remains to prove that the generating set obtained by removing the linear relations obtained
in Lemma 2 is now an independent set.
Proposition 5. Assume that |J | ≤ ℓ − 1 and |I| − |J | ≥ 2k, then the set of Xt’s with 2 6 t 6
ℓ+ |J |+ 1 and Y t’s with ℓ+ 2 6 t 6 2k form a basis of < C 2I >.
Proof. A consequence of Lemma 2 is that Xt with 2 6 t 6 ℓ+ |J |+ 1 and Y t with ℓ+ 2 6 t 6 2k
generate the code < C 2I > but it remains to prove that they are linearly independent. For this
purpose, let us assume that there exists a linear relation between them i.e., there exist as and bs
in GF (q) for 2 6 s 6 2k such that:
ℓ+|J |+1∑
s=2
asX
s +
2k∑
s=ℓ+2
bsY
s = 0. (4)
By setting as = 0 for ℓ + |J | + 2 6 s 6 2k and bs = 0 for 2 6 s 6 ℓ + 1, Equation (4) can be
rewritten as:
2k∑
s=2
(asX
s + bsY
s) = 0. (5)
Let us denote R(U)
def
=
2k∑
s=2
(as + bs)U
s. We know that if i /∈ J then Y si = X
s
i = x
s
i for s in
{2, . . . , 2k}. Therefore by Equation (5) we have R(xi) = 0 for any i /∈ J . As we have assumed that
|I| − |J | > 2k, it implies that R(U) = 0 or equivalently as = −bs for all s. In particular as = 0
for 2 6 s 6 ℓ + 1. On the other hand, when i ∈ J , we have Y si = 0 and X
s
i = x
s
i for any s in
{ℓ+ 2, . . . , ℓ+ |J |+ 1}. Hence when i ∈ J , Equation (4) leads in fact to:
ℓ+|J |+1∑
s=ℓ+2
asX
s
i = 0. (6)
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Now let us consider Q(U)
def
=
ℓ+|J |+1∑
s=ℓ+2
asU
s and observe that there exists some polynomial S(U) with
deg(S) 6 |J | − 1 such that:
Q(U) = U ℓ+2S(U).
From Equation (6) we know that Q(xi) = 0 for all i in J . Since all xi’s are different from 0, this
implies that S(xi) = 0. Since deg(S) 6 |J | − 1 this means that S(U) = 0, and therefore as = 0 for
all ℓ+ 2 6 s 6 ℓ+ |J |+ 1. Then equation (4) holds if and only if all the coefficients as and bs are
zero, which means that Xt with 2 6 t 6 ℓ+ |J |+1 and Y t with ℓ+2 6 t 6 2k form indeed a basis
of < C 2I > whose dimension is therefore 2k − 1 + |J |. ⊓⊔
Proposition 4 immediately follows from Proposition 5 which characterises a basis of < C 2I >.
